

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02592 231556Z

42

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W  
----- 070109

P R 231458Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2139

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T VIENNA 2592

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS; FROM US REP MBFR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REP ON  
DATA AND STABILIZING MEASURES, MARCH 19, 1974

1. SOVIET MILITARY ADVISOR, COL. KAPITONOV ENGAGED US REP IN  
CONVERSATION ON DATA ISSUE DURING SOCIAL OCCASION MARCH 19.  
RECIPIENTS SHOULD ALSO NOTE DISCUSSION OF DATA IN REPORTS OF  
AD HOC GROUP MEETINGS ON MARCH 21 AND MARCH 22.

2. US REP TOLD KAPITONOV THAT HE HAD TRIED TO CHECK AMB  
SMIRNOVSKY'S ASSERTION IN INFORMAL SESSION THAT NATO AIR  
MANPOWER HAD INCREASED ABOUT 10,000 IN 1973. HIS INFORMATION  
WAS THAT THERE HAD IN FACT BEEN NO INCREASE. KAPITONOV SAID  
THAT HE COULD AGREE THAT THE US AIR MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION  
AREA HAD NOT INCREASED BUT HE COULD NOT SAY THE SAME FOR THE  
BUNDESWEHR. HE SAID THAT SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY WOULD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02592 231556Z

BE IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER IN THE NEXT

INFORMAL SESSION.

3. US REP REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT SMIRNOVSKY HAD ASSERTED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE FRENCH GROUND FORCES COULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE NATO GROUND FORCE FIGURE OF 777,000 AND THAT ALLIES HAD EACH TIME SAID THAT THEY WERE SO INCLUDED. US REP SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF THE US AND SOVIETS DISCUSSED THE ELEMENTS OF THE 777,000 FIGURE AND THAT THE US MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO SO IF, AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS A BREAKDOWN OF THEIR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DATA ON WARSAW PACT FORCES.

4. KAPITONOV SAID THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD EXCHANGE DATA ON GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES, AIRCRAFT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SO THAT THEY COULD AGREE ON CEILINGS, BUT WITH RESPECT TO GROUND FORCES, THE FIRST PROBLEM WAS TO BE SURE THAT WE WERE COUNTING THE SAME FORCE ELEMENTS ON EACH SIDE. KAPITONOV POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS INCLUDE AIR DEFENSE FORCES AS A PART OF GROUND FORCES, WHEREAS THE BUNDESWEHR IS ORGANIZED WITH THE AIR DEFENSE IN THE AIR FORCES. ACCORDINGLY, BEFORE THERE WAS AN DISCUSSION OF FIGURES, THE ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED SHOULD BE DISCUSSED.

5. AT THIS POINT MR. SHARFMAN CAME UP. WHEN HE WAS INTRODUCED, KAPITANOV ASKED IF HE WERE THE "MEASURES MAN". US REP CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS. KAPITANOV THEN STATED THAT A DIVISION WAS MUCH TOO SMALL AS THE THRESHOLD FOR A MAJOR EXERCISE; THEY CONSIDER TRAINING BY A DIVISION TO BE TACTICAL TRAINING, AND IN NO SENSE A MAJOR MANEUVER. HE ASKED WHAT THE BASIS WAS FOR INCLUDING THIS LEVEL IN STABILIZING MEASURES. US REP RESPONDED THAT WE CONSIDERED THE TRAINING OF AN ENTIRE DIVISION TO BE SIGNIFICANT, AND ASKED WHAT LEVEL KAPITANOV THOUGH WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE. KAPITANOV RESPONDED THAT DIVISION TRAINING WAS LIKE THE TRAINING OF A BATTALIAN OR A REGIMENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THAT THE MEASURE AS PROPOSED WOULD REQUIRE AN ENTIRE NEW STAFF TO ISSUE NOTIFICATIONS, AND THAT THE LOWEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL WOULD BE A CORPS. US REP ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT TWO DIVISIONS, AND KAPITANOV SAID IT MEANT AT LEAST 3 DIVISIONS AND GENERALLY NUMBERED AROUND 40,000 TO 50,000 MEN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02592 231556Z

6. KAPITANOV NOTED THAT SOVIET DIVISIONS EXERCISE ALL THE TIME. US REP RESPONDED THAT FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE WEST EXCLUDED TRAINING IN MAJOR TRAINING AREAS FROM THE DEFINITION OF A MAJOR EXERCISE, AND THEREFORE ROUTINE EVERYDAY TRAINING WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. KAPITANOV RESPONDED THAT SOVIET DIVISIONS OFTEN DID NOT TRAIN WITHIN 25 KMS OF THEIR GARRISON.

7. SHARFMAN EXPLAINED THAT THE WESTERN MEASURE NOT ONLY EXCLUDED TRAINING WITHIN 25 KMS OF A GARRISON, BUT ALSO TRAINING IN NORMAL TRAINING AREAS. KAPITANOV ASKED WHAT THE DIFFERENCE WAS. SHARFMAN RESPONDED THAT AREAS, SUCH AS LETZIGERHEIDE, WHICH WERE USED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE TRAINING OF SOVIET FORCES, WERE REFERRED TO AS NORMAL TRAINING AREAS. THESE AREAS WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THOSE WITHIN 25 KMS OF PERMANENT GARRISONS.

8. KAPITANOV ASKED WHETHER IT WAS INTENDED TO LIMIT TRAINING TO 50,000 MEN EVERYWHERE. SHARFMAN RESPONDED THAT THERE WERE, IN FACT, 3 CATEGORIES: MAJOR TRAINING AREAS, IN WHICH TRAINING WOULD BE LIMITED TO 50,000; TRAINING BY A UNIT WITHIN 25 KMS OF ITS PERMANENT GARRISON, FOR WHICH NO NUMERICAL LIMITS WERE APPLIED; AND TRAINING EVERYWHERE ELSE, WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED TO 50,000. SHARFMAN ADDED THAT IN THE WESTERN VIEW, THE EXERCISING OF A DIVISION IN A TRAINING AREA WAS INDEED ROUTINE, BUT THE EXERCISE OF THAT SAME DIVISION OUT

IN THE COUNTRYSIDE MIGHT CREATE AMBIGUITIES. KAPITANOV RESPONDED THAT A DIVISION WAS TOO SMALL TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT.

9. US REP ASKED WHETHER KAPITONOV UNDERSTOOD THE WESTERN PROPOSED MEASURE ON LIMITATIONS OF FORCES ENTERING THE AREA. KAPITONOV ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT FORCES MOVING FROM BYELORUSSIA TO POLAND WOULD HAVE TO BE ANNOUNCED. US REP CONCURRED. KAPITONOV ADDED THAT, HOWEVER, MOVEMENTS FROM THE EASTERN PART OF EAST GERMANY TO THE WESTERN PART OF EAST GERMANY WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE ANNOUNCED. US REP CONCURRED. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION, KAPITONOV TOLD MEMBERS OF US DEL THAT HE HAD NOT THOUGHT HIS QUESTIONS INTENDED TO INDICATE THAT THE STABILIZING MEASURES OR SUCH WERE ACCEPTABLE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02592 231556Z

TO SOVIETS. TRINKA

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DATA, GROUND FORCES, MILITARY AIRCRAFT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, COMMITTEE MEETINGS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 23 MAR 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974VIENNA02592  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740063-0030  
**From:** VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740319/aaaaarsc.tel  
**Line Count:** 155  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 25 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <25 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REP ON DATA AND STABILIZING MEASURES, MARCH 19, 1974  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005